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ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS: A TOOL TO PROMOTE OFFICER SAFETY
AND REDUCE OFFICER INVOLVED SHOOTINGS OVER TIME
JOHN HOLLWAY,* CALVIN LEE,** & SEAN SMOOT***
INTRODUCTION
POLICING in America is an important and often polarizing topic.  Therise of cell phone video cameras has increased our nation’s awareness
of police/civilian interactions, and publicized numerous interactions that
have resulted in officer-involved shootings (OIS) of civilians—some “justi-
fied” in the eyes of the law and self-defense, others not.
The rhetoric that surrounds OIS can be deafening, both from those
who suggest that citizens bring on such events themselves and from those
who suggest that our police operate with unchecked power and perpetu-
ate socioeconomic disparities, particularly in low-income and minority
communities.  Underneath this rhetoric, however, are two facts that all
should be able to agree on.  First, any reasonable system of policing should
seek to minimize the number of OIS that occur.  Second, policing is inher-
ently dangerous work and the job of police officer carries with it life-
threatening risk on a daily basis.
This is not mere hyperbole—even a “simple” traffic stop carries life-
threatening risk as an officer approaches an unknown vehicle.  Will the
driver comply with the officer’s orders?  Is the driver on drugs?  Is the
driver armed? Does the driver have any outstanding warrants?  Will the
driver try to flee, creating danger to the officer and others on nearby roads
and sidewalks?  Each of these questions may require the officer to make
split-second decisions with life-altering consequences to the officer, the
driver, and innocent bystanders.  While training and protocol may provide
guidance, they cannot predict all scenarios.
For his part, the driver has his own anxieties.  Why have I been pulled
over?  Am I going to be late to where I was going?  Do I have my papers?
Was I pulled over because of my race?  Does the officer know about my
outstanding warrants?  Are they going to want to search my car?  And if I
have anything illegal, will they find it?  With so much unknown and so
much at stake, perhaps it is not surprising that these seemingly innocuous
everyday occurrences can rapidly escalate into an OIS.  And if this is the
level of stress confronting both officer and driver at a traffic stop, how
much more likely is it that police patrolling a drug corner, or in an area
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known for gun violence, will feel an enhanced need for the use of deadly
force to protect themselves?
To date, efforts to reduce OIS have taken two forms: improved train-
ing protocols designed to improve officer decision-making, and a variety
of accountability mechanisms designed to deter officer misconduct (usu-
ally defined as any departure from protocol, whether or not that depar-
ture was intentional or whether the OIS itself was intentional).1  While
each approach seeks to reduce the incidence of OIS in its own way, it is not
clear that our systems for evaluating a past OIS through administrative reviews,
civilian oversight, or civil and criminal litigation are effective in understanding
how to learn from past OIS or how to prevent the next OIS from occurring.
In this Article, we propose a third form of evaluating OIS: Root Cause
Analysis (RCA).  RCA is a method of problem solving designed to identify
core underlying factors, including environmental or systemic factors, that
contributed (along with individual decision-making) to generate an unde-
sirable outcome, organizational accident, or adverse event.2  Once these
core underlying causative factors have been identified, participants in the
system can fashion remedies that will reduce or remove them from the
system, thereby preventing future occurrences of the undesirable outcome
(in this case, an OIS).3
RCA is part of a prospective, non-blaming “systems approach” to
preventing error in complex human systems that has been successfully
used to reduce errors in aviation, healthcare, manufacturing, nuclear
power, and other areas.4  One of its key precepts is that individuals in com-
plex systems are acting rationally.  Put differently, it assumes that an indi-
vidual in a system will act in ways that are believed to benefit that
individual at the moment the decision is made.  Thus, while individuals
may willingly deviate from established norms of behavior, they will do so
with a rational purpose.  To change outcomes in a system, we must change
the decisions that lead to the outcome; to change those decisions, we must
alter the circumstances so that the unwelcome decision no longer appears
to benefit the decision-maker.  This presumption that people are acting in
1. See, e.g., Officer Involved Shootings Data: Reducing Deadly Force Incidents, DALLAS
POLICE DEP’T, http://www.dallaspolice.net/ois/ois [https://perma.cc/ADE2-QAG
D] (last visited Aug. 15, 2017); see also Leon Neyfakh, A Police Department That’s
Embraced Reform, SLATE (July 8, 2016, 12:10 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/
news_and_politics/crime/2016/07/the_dallas_police_department_has_been_a_
model_for_reducing_officer_involved.html [https://perma.cc/N9QR-76FW].
2. See What Is Root Cause Analysis (RCA)?, AM. SOC’Y FOR QUALITY, http://asq
.org/learn-about-quality/root-cause-analysis/overview/overview.html [https://per
ma.cc/9Z8R-ST46] (last visited Oct. 29, 2017); see also Root Cause Analysis and Prob-
lem Solving, IAQG (April 2014), http://www.nmgaerospace.com/wp-content/up
loads/2014/08/IAQG-7.4.2_Root_Cause_Analysis_and_Problem_Solving_01_APR-
2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/LC7T-YQNB].
3. See PAUL F. WILSON, ET AL., ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS: A TOOL FOR TOTAL QUAL-
ITY MANAGEMENT 8–17 (1993).
4. See Root Cause Analysis and Problem Solving, supra note 2.  For a discussion of
Root Cause Analysis in other fields, see infra notes 7–10.
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ways not designed to injure others, but instead simply to perform their
tasks in the system effectively, is a core tenet of a “non-blaming” event
review.  As the Institute of Medicine recognized in its landmark publica-
tion To Err Is Human, punishment and blame have a role to play in keep-
ing actors in line, but have a limited ability to deter good-faith behavior
that leads to errors:
[M]istakes can best be prevented by designing the health system
at all levels to make it safer—to make it harder for people to do
something wrong and easier for them to do it right.  Of course,
this does not mean that individuals can be careless.  People still
must be vigilant and held responsible for their actions.  But when
an error occurs, blaming an individual does little to make the
system safer and prevent someone else from committing the
same error.5
It is in this setting that an RCA takes place.  As British organizational
safety expert James Reason states, we “cannot change the human condi-
tion, [but] we can change the conditions under which humans work[,]”
leading to a system that is safer and has fewer errors.6  Industries like avia-
tion,7 medicine,8 and manufacturing,9 as well as emergency services such
5. INST. OF MED., TO ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM 2 (Nov.
1999).
6. See James Reason, Human Error: Models and Management, 320 BRIT. MED. J.
768, 769 (2000) (proposing the Swiss-cheese model for systemic failure).
7. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) undertakes RCA imme-
diately after catastrophic events (e.g., airline crashes, train collisions, bridge col-
lapses). See generally DAVID TOCHEN & THOMAS W. TOBIN, NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BD.
& WILSON ELSER, THE ANATOMY OF AN NTSB ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION (Apr. 2013),
https://www.wilsonelser.com/writable/files/Legal_Analysis/anatomy_of_an_ntsb
_accident_investigation_tobin_tochen_april_2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/3MSD-
7677].  These reviews are all separated from associated litigation and administra-
tive reviews, with NTSB root cause investigators operating independently.  As a
result of continuous quality improvement driven by RCA, the aviation industry’s
safety record has dramatically improved in the past fifty years, moving from
roughly 50 fatal accidents per 100,000 flights to less than 0.2 such accidents while
the total number of flights has increased more than 500%. See generally BOEING,
STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF COMMERCIAL JET AIRPLANE ACCIDENTS: WORLDWIDE OPERA-
TIONS 1959–2016 17 (2016), http://www.boeing.com/resources/boeingdotcom/
company/about_bca/pdf/statsum.pdf [https://perma.cc/8HM3-HKJ7].
8. Hospitals like the Montefiore Medical Center implement RCA on issues of
medical malpractice that are independent from litigation. See generally Montefiore
Medical Center, Just Culture Tool (on file with authors) (Montefiore Medical
Center granted the Authors permission to use and reproduce its “Just Culture
Tool,” displayed as Figure 5 in this Article); see also generally MONTEFIORE MED.
CTR., http://www.montefiore.org/about [https://perma.cc/J3HD-CYNN] (last vis-
ited Oct. 29, 2017).
9. See Kiran M et al., Root Cause Analysis for Reducing Breakdowns in a Manufac-
turing Industry, 3 INT’L J. EMERGING TECH. & ADVANCED ENGINEERING 211, 211
(2013) (discussing use of RCA in manufacturing industries).
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as firefighters10 and some aspects of law enforcement,11 already imple-
ment RCA to fundamentally make their environments safer.
Existing retrospective accountability measures for law enforcement,
such as internal affairs, OIS administrative reviews, civil rights litigation,
civilian review boards, etc., are necessary to ensure official accountability
for OIS that occur, and to secure appropriate compensation for civilians
who may be innocent victims of an OIS.  It cannot be seriously debated,
however, that those mechanisms are insufficient in reducing the incidence
or prevalence of OIS; according to the Washington Post, there were 991
individuals shot and killed by police in the United States in 2015, 963 in
2016, and 508 as of this writing in 2017.12  The number of individuals shot
and wounded ostensibly increases this figure considerably.
Existing review mechanisms are based on retrospective accountability
and evaluate whether the officer, the individual who was shot, or some
third party bears blame.  Such measures which focus on individual culpa-
bility may deter police from shootings caused by deliberate or intentional
10. Firefighters around the country have access to an RCA service called
firefighternearmiss.com, which allows firefighters to read, send, and receive the
results of root cause analyses undertaken with near-miss and catastrophe data gen-
erated around the country. See generally NAT’L FIREFIGHTER NEAR MISS REPORTING
SYS., FIREFIGHTER NEAR MISS 2016 ANNUAL REPORT (2016), http://firereports.na
tionalnearmiss.org/Portals/2/EasyDNNNewsDocuments/Annual%20Reports/
2016%20Firefighter%20Near%20Miss%20Annual%20Report.pdf [https://perma
.cc/L42Y-SMVK].
11. For a discussion on the application of RCA or Sentinel Event Reviews to
policing, see James M. Doyle, Learning About Learning from Error, POLICE FOUND.
IDEAS IN AM. POLICING, No. 14, May 2012, at 3, https://www.policefoundation.org/
wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Doyle-2012-Learning-About-Learning-From-Error
.pdf [https://perma.cc/XC8P-5XZG].  Currently, the Police Foundation is at-
tempting a similar website to the firefighters called leonearmiss.org.  For a discus-
sion of these techniques to learn from error more broadly in criminal justice, the
National Institute of Justice Sentinel Event Initiative has issued several publica-
tions, see generally NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NIJ STRATEGIC
RESEARCH AND IMPLEMENTATION PLAN: SENTINEL EVENTS INITIATIVE (2017), https://
www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/250472.pdf [https://perma.cc/KU9E-ZSMM]; NAT’L
INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PAVING THE WAY: LESSONS LEARNED IN SEN-
TINEL EVENT REVIEWS (2015), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/249097.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3AZF-BKKQ]; NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
MENDING JUSTICE: SENTINEL EVENT REVIEWS (2014), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdf-
files1/nij/247141.pdf [https://perma.cc/VX2K-ELGY].  For recommendations on
the conduct of RCA in a crime lab or forensics context, see NAT’L COMM’N ON
FORENSIC SCI., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DIRECTIVE RECOMMENDATION: ROOT CAUSE
ANALYSIS (RCA) IN FORENSIC SCIENCE, (Aug. 11, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/
ncfs/file/786581/download [https://perma.cc/QUQ8-MDQJ].
12. See Fatal Force, WASH. POST, https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/
national/police-shootings-2017/ [https://perma. cc/FW4A-KHZN] (last visited
July 6, 2017).
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misconduct.13  They have failed to reduce the occurrence of accidental or
unintentional acts or encounters that escalate into an OIS.14
The reality is that many, and perhaps most OIS occur despite the fact that no
one—neither the officer, nor the civilian, nor the general public—wants them to
occur.  Rather, a sequence of contributing events led the officer to feel that
pulling the trigger is his or her best decision.  An understanding of these
multiple, contributing factors—environmental, informational, situational,
supervisory, etc.—is essential to interrupting that sequence for the next
officer and next civilian.
It is important to state at the outset that RCA is not a substitute for
current mechanisms for accountability and remediation.  Rather, it serves
as a necessary complement to those retrospective mechanisms, providing a
forward-looking form of event review focused on community and officer
safety, seeking to prevent future undesired outcomes and gradually im-
proving the safety of a system through targeted reforms over time.
We will first describe the application of non-blaming Root Cause
Analysis to evaluate officer-involved shootings, permitting an understand-
ing of all the contributory factors of a shooting, and provide a road map to
guide policy reforms and reduce OIS over time.  In Part II, we will explore
the limitations of existing review mechanisms.  In Parts III–IV, we will de-
scribe the principles of RCA, and discuss how and why RCA has such
promise to improve the overall quality and safety of policing, lessons that
may be applicable to OIS.  And finally, in Parts V and VI, we will provide
an example of how RCA might function in reviewing an OIS.  Part VII
concludes.
I. CURRENT METHODS OF EVENT REVIEWS FOCUS ON ACCOUNTABILITY FOR
PAST ERRORS, RATHER THAN PREVENTION OF FUTURE ERRORS
Our nation’s police officers work in hugely complex, rapidly chang-
ing, high-stress environments in which decisions with life-altering conse-
quences must be made instantaneously with imperfect information and
zero tolerance for error.
It is an unfortunate reality that police officers will occasionally use
deadly force in the line of duty, and that use of force will sometimes result
in injury to others.  There can be no question that officer safety is of para-
mount concern, and officers should be empowered to protect themselves
against threats to their well-being presented while they are serving their
communities.  While OIS may be unavoidable, however (e.g., a depressed
individual provoking a deadly confrontation with an officer by threatening
him with a handgun, or other situations colloquially referred to as “suicide
by cop”) our system of criminal justice defines any OIS—even one in
13. See, e.g., Kami Chavis Simmons, The Politics of Policing: Ensuring Stakeholder
Collaboration in the Federal Reform of Local Law Enforcement Agencies, 98 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 489, 496 (2008).
14. See, e.g., Fatal Force, supra note 12.
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which all protocols were followed by the officer—as an undesirable out-
come, and one worthy of review to understand how and why it occurred
with the goal being its prevention in the future.15
It is important to note from the outset that defining an outcome as
undesirable from the perspective of system design is not the same thing as
stating that an individual officer is at fault for the outcome, or should be
blamed or punished for his or her role in the outcome.  Often, the facts
surrounding an OIS show that the officer has followed all established pro-
tocols or “best practices,” conducting him or herself with great profession-
alism.  This is sometimes called a “clean shoot.”16
The question of whether an OIS is a “clean shoot” is typically deter-
mined by an internal police administrative review, which may then be chal-
lenged by an external review board, a civilian review board, or litigation in
criminal or civil court.17  In each case, the inquiry into the shooting is
focused on the question of the officer’s competence or negligence in the
moment, rather than asking why the encounter occurred in the first
place.18  This framing of the question is crucial, as it drives the lessons that
we are able to take from the event.  When we ask, “who is accountable for
this OIS?” we limit our learning to the question of personal accountabil-
ity—did the officer follow his training, protocols, and procedures?  When
we ask, “what are all of the contributing factors that led to this OIS?” we
open our learning to a wide variety of factors.  Did the officer follow his or
her training but acted on inaccurate information from the police dis-
patcher?  Did the police dispatcher follow his or her training but misun-
derstand information relayed from the scene?  Did the officer follow his or
her training but go to the wrong address because of a clerical error in the
15. See Alan Feuer, The Nation: Desperadoes; Drawing a Bead on a Baffling Endg-
ame: Suicide by Cop, N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 1988) http://www.nytimes.com/1998/06/
21/ weekinreview/the-nation-desperadoes-drawing-a-bead-on-a-baffling-endgame-
suicide-by-cop.html [https://perma.cc/VWL2-HECX] (“The term suicide by cop
was coined in 1983 by Karl Harris, a former California police officer with a Ph.D. in
psychology who worked at a suicide hot line in Los Angeles after leaving the force.
‘As a cop, I knew of a number of cases where it appeared that people had actually
forced police officers to shoot them,’ Dr. Harris said.  ‘In the suicide business I saw
all the different ways people attempted suicide, and it occurred to me that maybe
some people were actually forcing cops to shoot them because they wanted to
die.’”).
16. See, e.g., 139 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 69 (2017) (providing expert testi-
mony of definition of “clean shoot”).
17. See CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICER-IN-
VOLVED SHOOTINGS: A GUIDE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT LEADERS 16 (2016), http://
www.theiacp.org/portals/0/documents/pdfs/e051602754_Officer_Involved_v8
.pdf [https://perma.cc/UT4R-WJNJ] (discussing that administrative investigations
intend “to determine whether the involved officer’s actions were justified, in accor-
dance with agency policy, procedures, rules, and training”).
18. See, e.g., Officer Involved Shooting FAQ, S.F. POLICE DEP’T, http://sanfrancis-
copolice.org/officer-involved-shooting-faq [https://perma.cc/BS5V-W98C] (last
visited Oct. 29, 2017) (explaining that administrative investigations determine
whether officer involved violated policy or procedure during shooting).
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search warrant?  Did the officer follow his or her training but had an
equipment malfunction due to a protocol regarding how the equipment
was to be worn on the uniform?  The modifications that would be pro-
posed in response to each of these scenarios will be different, and only
occasionally will disciplining the officer be sufficient to prevent the next
OIS.  Thus, something more than administrative accountability reviews is
needed.
In fact, while clean shoots are rarely analyzed as unintended out-
comes, they provide uniquely positive opportunities for improving our sys-
tem of policing as they allow for a blame-free event review designed not to
make the system more accountable, but rather to make it safer—to reduce
the likelihood that the next officer, when confronted with the same situa-
tion, will have to rely on deadly force to successfully resolve the situation.
Indeed, because the officer involved has already been absolved of blame,
there can be no other justification for the RCA, and all participants can
put away their fears of recrimination or discipline and join in the educa-
tional process of the RCA.
RCA, sometimes referred to as “sentinel event review”19 or “just cul-
ture event review,”20 is a form of quality improvement in complex human
systems.  Its forward-looking focus affixes no blame or criticism to the of-
ficer(s) involved in the incident, seeking to improve a system that has al-
lowed an interaction between both officer and civilian to unfold in a
manner that led to an unintended and undesirable outcome—the shoot-
ing of a civilian.21  As such, it can be a useful tool to learn from error and
to improve policing for officers and communities alike and should be ad-
ded as a continuous process for enhancing officer and community safety
alongside existing processes for accountability.
The purpose of law enforcement is crime prevention and public
safety.  We want our police to protect our citizens and communities by
reducing crime—and over time preventing crime—within the limitations
on police authority set forth in the Constitution.  It is never a goal of our
system of law enforcement that police injure members of the community,
whether they are perpetrators of crime or innocents.  Thus, while an of-
ficer shooting a civilian in legitimate self-defense may sometimes be una-
voidable, it is never a desired outcome of a police/citizen interaction.
19. See STRATEGIC RESEARCH AND IMPLEMENTATION PLAN: SENTINEL EVENTS INI-
TIATIVE, supra note 11; MENDING JUSTICE: SENTINEL EVENT REVIEWS, supra note 11.
20. See Using Root Cause Analysis to Instill a Culture of Self-Improvement: Program
Replication Materials, INNOVATIONS IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SUMMIT III, April 20–21,
2015, at 2, 4, http://www.apainc.org/wp-content/uploads/Montgomery-County-
Implementation-Guide-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/K869-XPL9].
21. We recognize that there are those who feel that the shooting of an indi-
vidual deliberately attacking a police officer may not be an “undesirable outcome.”
From the perspective of the design of the system, we posit that “alive and unin-
jured” is always the intended outcome of any police/civilian interaction and that
our obligation is to strive for that outcome in all instances regardless of its ultimate
attainability.
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To confirm the undesirability of such events, one need only look to
the myriad of approaches we have taken to distribute accountability and
blame on the participants in an OIS when it occurs.  We have a dizzying
array of administrative reviews, civilian oversight committees, civil and
criminal litigation procedures, and other processes built around the lauda-
ble goals of transparency, accountability, violence deterrence, protection
of civilians, and victim compensation.22
These accountability mechanisms are unquestionably important and
useful in establishing standards of police behavior, publicizing those stan-
dards and improving compliance with them.  They are also important to
address the plight of parties who are wronged or injured by police ac-
tion.23  At the same time, one might reasonably question the sufficiency of
our punishment and deterrence-based approaches to reduce OIS over
time, given that our rates of police shootings are not decreasing.24  One
also might question the completeness of the information we receive from
event participants when the information can, and will be used against
them (whether in a court of law, or settings with less due process).
Industries like aviation and healthcare may not seem immediately
analogous to policing.  However, if one thinks about policing as a hugely
complex, rapidly changing, high-stress environment in which decisions
with life-altering consequences must be made instantaneously with imper-
fect information and zero tolerance for error, the similarities among polic-
ing, medicine, and aviation become more apparent.  As such, policing can
benefit from the same tools and procedures that have emerged in aviation
and medicine to protect not only the customers of these systems (patients,
passengers, and citizens), but also professionals within the system (doc-
tors, pilots, and police officers).  The standard administrative accountabil-
ity mechanisms commonly used in policing today are necessary but
22. See Nirej Sekhon, Blue on Black: An Empirical Assessment of Police Shootings,
54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 189, 192 (2017) (analyzing Chicago’s Independent Police
Review Authority reports, which suggest limitations on post-hoc accountability
mechanisms); see also Steven D. Clymer, Compelled Statements from Police Officers and
Garrity Immunity, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1309, 1369–70 (2001) (discussing how focus on
officer Fifth Amendment protections and effective administrative investigation can
exist in tension with officer discipline); John V. Jacobi, Prosecuting Police Misconduct,
2000 WIS. L. REV. 789, 811 (2000) (explaining how 18 U.S.C. § 242 focuses federal
investigation on an individual officer’s mens rea).
23. See Steve Schmadeke, Van Dyke Indicted on 16 Added Counts for Each Shot to
Laquan McDonald, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 23, 2017, 07:04 PM), http://www.chicago-
tribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-laquan-mcdonald-jason-van-dyke-court-met-
story.html [https://perma.cc/U6FZ-TMMF] (incident where officer allegedly shot
a teenager in the side and back sixteen times); see also Cole Poland, OK County DA
Clears Officers in Use of Deadly Force Shooting from March, NEWS9 (May 11, 2017, 10:40
AM), http://www.news9.com/story/35404866/ok-county-da-clears-officers-in-use-
of-deadly-force-shooting-from-march [https://perma.cc/8YT6-7FX5] (clearing an
officer who shot a motorist who was backing his car into the officer during a high
speed chase).
24. See Fatal Force, supra note 12 (noting that in past two years, police have
shot roughly 977 people each year and that in 2017 the rate remains similar).
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insufficient to truly improve the safety and effectiveness of law enforce-
ment, and RCA and a culture of continuous learning from error should be
added to our arsenal of quality improvement initiatives in policing.
RCA25 is used in aviation, healthcare, manufacturing, and other com-
plex systems as part of a culture of safety and learning from error, helping
practitioners learn from unintended outcomes, whether those outcomes
were caused by good faith errors or mistakes (e.g., “accidents”) or know-
ing or reckless violations of rules or procedures (e.g., “misconduct”).  RCA
creates a safe space for individuals involved in unintended outcomes to
explain their decisions and motivations, and for evaluators to understand
the various contributing factors that led otherwise well-intended police of-
ficers with specific training to nonetheless be involved in an unintended
outcome.  Its learnings are specific and tailored to the event in question,
and its recommendations and reforms enable the thoughtful redesign of
preventative procedures, techniques, and other systemic solutions.26
II. ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEWS, CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT BOARDS, AND CIVIL
AND CRIMINAL LITIGATION: RETROSPECTIVE
ACCOUNTABILITY REVIEWS
Despite the best efforts of all involved, OIS occur with alarming fre-
quency.27  Today, when an OIS occurs, our communities have developed a
broad number of approaches to reviewing the event.  While each jurisdic-
tion creates its own rules and procedures for these, at a high level, OIS
event reviews can be separated into administrative (e.g., internal) reviews,
civilian oversight boards, and civil or criminal litigation.28  These mecha-
nisms differ on important points, but share one key characteristic: they are
designed to determine retrospective accountability for the OIS on the part
of the officer as an individual or the department as an organization, and
spend very little time on forward-looking reforms that will prevent the
25. See What Is Root Cause Analysis (RCA)?, supra note 2 (“A root cause is a
factor that caused a nonconformance and should be permanently eliminated
through process improvement.  Root Cause Analysis is a collective term that de-
scribes a wide range of approaches, tools, and techniques to uncover causes of
problems.”).
26. Cf. Steve Chapman, Freddie Gray and the Rush to Judgment, CHI. TRIB. (June
24, 2016, 02:25 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/chapman/
ct-freddie-gray-justice-police-michael-brown-perspec-0626-md-20160624-column
.html [https://perma.cc/VDY3-4RKL] (discussing how an elected prosecutor’s re-
sponsiveness to public presumptions of wrongdoing resulted in a rush to prosecute
in the case of Freddie Gray’s death in police custody).
27. See generally Fatal Force, supra note 12.
28. See PETER FINN, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CITIZEN RE-
VIEW OF POLICE: APPROACHES & IMPLEMENTATION 14, 17–66 (Mar. 2001) https://
www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/184430.pdf [https://perma.cc/L5ES-EQCD] (dis-
cussing OIS event reviews in multiple oversight systems that include internal re-
views, civil oversight boards, and civil or criminal investigations).
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next officer in a similar situation from discharging his weapon (whether in
justified fashion or not).29
Law enforcement is already a highly-regulated government function,
with a multitude of review systems in place to hold actors accountable.30
Police officers are subject to codes of conduct,31 precinct regulations,32
and binding case law33 that govern their interactions with civilians and
when use of force against civilians conforms to an “acceptable practice.”
A. Criminal Review
An officer’s conduct in an OIS typically is reviewed rapidly by the of-
ficer’s own department’s homicide investigators (or those of a different
agency) and then put before a state prosecutor for review.34  Historically,
public perceptions were that prosecutors, whose professional role requires
substantial daily interaction with and cooperation from the police, would
be unlikely to press charges against police officers unless the circum-
stances surrounding the OIS were egregious.  Whether or not one accepts
this premise, there is data to suggest that prosecutors across the United
States are increasingly willing to file criminal charges against police of-
ficers involved in OIS.35  Some of this is likely motivated by the same con-
cerns that non-criminal justice professionals feel as a seemingly constant
stream of cell phone videos parades across YouTube showing OIS that
seem to show officers shooting defenseless suspects who appear to laype-
ople not to pose a threat of immediate physical danger.  Some of it may
also be motivated by political instincts: after the decisions not to charge
the officers involved in the high-profile OIS of Tamir Rice in Cleveland,
Ohio, for example, the elected prosecutor was defeated at the polls in his
29. See Simmons, supra note 13, at 504 (discussing retrospective nature of civil
oversight reviews that makes it ill-suited to address misconduct before it occurs).
30. See FINN, supra note 28, at 14, 17–66.
31. See, e.g., ROCHESTER POLICE DEP’T, ROCHESTER POLICE DEPARTMENT: RULES
& REGULATIONS (2010), http://www.cityofrochester.gov/article.aspx?id=85899489
01 [https://perma.cc/3TYB-GUGX]; see also e.g., MILWAUKEE CTY. SHERIFF, LAW EN-
FORCEMENT CODE OF CONDUCT, http://county.milwaukee.gov/LawEnforcement
Codeof9154.htm [https://perma.cc/7BLR-32FY] (last visited Aug. 15, 2017).
32. See, e.g., CHI. POLICE DEP’T, ART. V: RULES OF CONDUCT, https://www.city
ofchicago.org/dam/city/depts/cpb/PoliceDiscipline/RulesofConduct.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PC94-VF5G] (last visited Oct. 29, 2017).
33. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012); see also Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161
(1992) (discussing purpose of § 1983 as deterring “state actors from using badge of
their authority to deprive individuals of their federally guaranteed rights”); Carey
v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 253–54 (1978) (explaining purpose of § 1983).
34. See FINN, supra note 28, at 35 (providing example of police department’s
review policy).
35. See, e.g., Ian Simpson, Prosecution of U.S. Police for Killings Surges to Highest in
Decade, HUFFPOST (Oct. 26, 2015, 09:21 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ent
ry/prosecution-police-killings_us_562e26aee4b0ec0a3894eb23 [https://perma.cc/
BWT3-7UK9].
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next election.36  In a frustrating “Catch 22” for prosecutors, however, one
of the long-cited reasons for not bringing charges against police officers
acting in the line of duty is proving true: juries can be reluctant to
convict.37
Criminal charges in OIS reflect an apparent contradiction among
community responses to these tragic events, with the community simulta-
neously demanding that criminal charges be brought and yet refusing to
impose the penalties they enable.38 Perhaps the way to rationalize and
understand that conflict is to observe that policing is hugely difficult and
dangerous work, that the decision process and perceptions of police of-
ficers cannot be seen adequately in YouTube videos, and that often, upon
the more detailed analysis afforded by a criminal trial, the officer’s actions
can be better understood.  Two points arise from this trend: first, that the
utility of criminal charges (imposing a punishment to the officer, provid-
ing the victim with a community response, or creating a deterrence for
future unsafe conduct) is limited if those charges do not ultimately end in
convictions; and second, that the disinclination of juries to impose crimi-
nal charges upon deeper reflection into the incident may reflect the real-
ity that the officer in fact has no intent to engage in the OIS, but rather
gets swept up in dynamic and unexpected events that leave the officer in
the honest (and terrifying) belief that his or her life is in immediate dan-
ger, causing a reaction that the jury can understand, and potentially even
sympathize with.  If so, as we shall see below, we have identified precisely
the situation for which a RCA has been designed.
B. Administrative/Internal Affairs Review
The second level of investigation or review is the department’s own
internal affairs or administrative review, which often occurs at the same
time or parallel to the criminal review.39  It is standard in these investiga-
36. See, e.g., Richard Pe´rez-Pen˜a, Angered by Cities’ Handling of Police Shootings,
Voters Oust Two Prosecutors, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/
2016/03/17/us/angered-by-cities-handling-of-police-shootings-voters-oust-two-
prosecutors.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/Y6XC-285J] (discussing prosecutor who
did not pursue charges against police officer who killed Tamir Rice being defeated
at polls).
37. See Mitch Smith, Minnesota Officer Acquitted in Killing of Philando Castile,
N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/16/us/police-
shooting-trial-philando-castile.html?_r=0 (reporting the acquittal of the officer
around the central question of he had reason to fear that Mr. Castile was reaching
for his gun); see also Kevin Rector, Charges Dropped, Freddie Gray Case Concludes with
Zero Convictions Against Officers, BALT. SUN (July 27, 2017, 08:57 PM), http://www
.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/freddie-gray/bs-md-ci-miller-pretrial-motions-
20160727-story.html [https://perma.cc/LJ46-KHPU].
38. See, e.g., Minn. Cops Escape Charges in Controversial Shooting Death, CBS NEWS
(March 30, 2016, 12:11 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/jamar-clark-shoot-
ing-prosecutor-no-charges-against-police/ [https://perma.cc/6PWL-RLTZ].
39. See CMMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., supra note 17, at 16–17 (discussing
process of OIS investigations which includes criminal investigation and administra-
tive review).
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tions for an officer to be interrogated by a supervisor after being ordered
to answer questions under threat of job forfeiture (e.g., a compelled Gar-
rity Statement).40  These investigations are usually adversarial41 in nature
as they are designed for use as a basis for departmental disciplinary pur-
poses.  Given that their main purpose is to determine discipline to the
officer, it is reasonable to assume that the officer will provide as positive a
depiction of the officer’s performance as possible, and limit the transfer of
negative information, thereby limiting the full understanding of the event
in question.42
C. Civilian Oversight Board Review
In addition to the criminal and administrative reviews, many jurisdic-
tions have adopted some form of civilian oversight review mechanism,
often called a civilian review board (CRB).43  These organizations can play
a useful role as intermediaries between communities and police depart-
ments, providing communities with greater visibility into the police de-
partment and a better understanding of the department’s views, while
providing police departments with a (hopefully) less rancorous dialogue
with the community regarding an OIS and a platform for explaining the
event in greater detail and with greater nuance.  On the other hand, many
departments chafe at the concept of having their actions reviewed by civil-
ians, many of whom will take what the officers feel is a simplistic and nega-
tively biased view of police activity.44  Under this school of thought, it is
unfair for a police officer’s career to be impacted by the views of unedu-
40. Garrity Rights, so named after the Supreme Court’s decision in Garrity v.
New Jersey, protect public employees from being compelled to incriminate them-
selves during investigatory interviews conducted by their employers.  385 U.S. 493
(1967).  This protection stems from the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, which declares that the government cannot compel a person to be a
witness against one’s self. See id. at 499.
41. Very few police departments have embraced the “Just Culture” concept
described elsewhere in this paper, relying almost exclusively on what might be de-
scribed as “punishment-based” discipline.  While such a system may have its uses, it
is quite different in focus than the “system approach” or the philosophy behind
conducting an RCA.  The former is interested in placing blame and punishing for
policy or procedure violations, believing that people’s ability and intentions are
the main drivers of error, while the latter emphasizes problem identification and
understanding, believing that policy or procedure modification, environment im-
provement, and education can improve the environment in which good people
make reasonable decisions leading to better outcomes
42. See CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., supra note 17, at 16–17 (explaining
purposes of administrative investigations); FINN, supra note 28, at 57 (providing
overview of San Francisco’s oversight process).
43. See Civilian Review Boards, CATO INST: POLICE MISCONDUCT, https://www.
policemisconduct.net/explainers/civilian-review-boards/ [https://perma.cc/TX6
3-A5GU] (last visited Aug. 15, 2017) (discussing civilian review boards used by po-
lice departments).
44. See, e.g., Martin Kaste, Police Are Learning to Accept Civilian Oversight, But
Distrust Lingers, NPR (Feb. 21, 2015, 10:18 AM), http://www.npr.org /2015/02/
21/387770044/police-are-learning-to-accept-civilian-oversight-but-distrust-lingers
12
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 5 [2017], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol62/iss5/2
2017] ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS 895
cated (at least in terms of policing) citizens, who are unlikely to under-
stand or appreciate all of the training an officer receives, the underlying
reasoning behind existing protocols, or the many factors that a trained
police officer is considering or reacting to during an event that involves
the use of deadly force.
There is a wide variety of CRB roles and areas of authority.45  For
instance, some CRBs sit in on actual internal investigation procedures re-
garding OIS.46  Others may not participate in the review itself, but can
review the department’s internal investigations and make inquiries of the
department’s internal investigators.47  While many lack the power to rec-
ommend discipline or approve or disapprove of investigation conclu-
sions,48 other CRBs have subpoena powers and full authority to
recommend charges or even to mete out discipline.49
D. Civil Litigation
With or without an actual lawsuit being filed, an officer’s conduct in
an OIS or other use of deadly force is typically investigated or reviewed by
his or her employer’s (or the employer’s insurance carrier’s) civil defense
counsel.50  While ultimate liability will be determined against a height-
ened standard of qualified immunity given to police operating in their
official capacity, and using the standard of the reasonably trained police
officer under the circumstances as opposed to what a reasonably prudent
individual might do, the fact remains that these cases often proceed to
civil litigation against the officer, the department and the jurisdiction, or
all three, irrespective of the officer’s conduct.51
E. Media Review
The officer’s conduct will also be scrutinized by the public and the
news media, who typically obtain all materials produced by each of the
aforementioned investigations, and may also obtain the foundational
[https://perma.cc/6KTV-QWRG] (discussing that police officers say civilian over-
sight boards are politicized and unfair to them).
45. See FINN, supra note 28, at 14, 17–66 (providing examples of police depart-
ments’ review policies including roles of civilian review boards).
46. See Civilian Review Boards, supra note 43.
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See, e.g., S.F. POLICE DEP’T, supra note 18 (discussing purpose of Legal
Division of San Francisco Police Department is “to assist Office of the City Attorney
for future possible civil litigation in defense of the SFPD”).
51. See CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., supra note 17, at 7, 18–20 (discussing
that civil or criminal litigation may be directed at officer or governing
jurisdiction).
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materials analyzed by the investigation, through public records requests or
other sources.52
F.  Root Cause Analysis Seeks Forward-Looking Solutions
Each of these mechanisms typically evaluates the officer’s actions, and
potentially the actions of the department as a whole, and of the victim(s),
in hindsight, and generates a punishment—typically financial, though oc-
casionally criminal—related to the level of accountability for the OIS.
Thus, criminal or civil liability, or the administration of an internal sanc-
tion (e.g., citation, suspension, loss of job) are applied retrospectively as a
deterrent to future error.53  The logic is that punishing an officer for inap-
propriate use of a firearm will incent other officers to use their firearms
more appropriately, and will incent jurisdictions to conduct additional
training or supervision necessary to prevent or reduce additional errors.54
While such logic may be useful to reduce exceptional violations (de-
liberate departures from protocols designed to achieve the OIS as an out-
come), the lack of reduction in OIS across the country over time suggests
(a) that the majority of OIS are not so malicious and (b) that substantial
amounts of community outrage, criminal charges, and huge civil settle-
ments are having very little effect on the rate of OIS across the country,
despite being a substantial topic in the national news cycle.
To be sure, accountability and some form of compensatory remedy to
citizens and a community who may be injured by an “unjust” OIS is impor-
tant and just.  But if the reviews being conducted are not sufficient to re-
duce the incidence of unwanted OIS, a different approach is needed for
all involved.  Reducing OIS will protect police officers themselves, as well
as civilians in the community, and will enhance police/community rela-
tionships and restore some much-needed legitimacy to community polic-
ing nationwide.
From the standpoint of the police officer, who is the “tip of the spear”
in most if not all of these events, the prospect of adding yet another layer
of conduct review, regardless of its laudable goal, following one of these
events is likely to receive a very negative reaction.
52. See id. at 29–30 (explaining importance of media relations including so-
cial media and news media).
53. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691–95 (1978) (holding
that a municipality can be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for systemic viola-
tions of citizens’ constitutional rights); Candace McCoy, How Civil Rights Lawsuits
Have Improved American Policing, in HOLDING POLICE ACCOUNTABLE 157, 165, 203–04
(Candace McCoy, ed. 2010).
54. See, e.g., OFFICE OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF JUS-
TICE, THE PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING 51–61 (2015),
https://cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/taskforce_finalreport.pdf [https://perma
.cc/VJ66-RGYJ] [hereinafter THE PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLIC-
ING] (recommending a variety of training reforms to help improve police/citizen
interactions).
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This is not to say that officers lack interest in learning from mistakes
or errors.  To the contrary, most police officers are conscientious,
hard-working individuals who care deeply about their jobs and about not
making mistakes.  In fact, many joined the police force precisely because
of the quality represented by the badge and its reputation for high stan-
dards and excellence.  They have no desire to experience a bad outcome
in the first place, much less to repeat it.
At the same time, given that (a) all of the mechanisms described
above are essentially punitive, rather than educational or constructive in
nature, and (b) are, in some instances, conducted by people who have not
received police training, it should not be surprising that many police of-
ficers approach review processes with an ingrained sense of skepticism.
This can have a chilling effect on lessons learned by creating a disincentive
to provide information related to the OIS in the first place, or to actively
block the investigation.
This skeptical mindset on the part of officers poses potential
problems for the utility of RCA, and must be addressed early and often
throughout an RCA process.  RCAs are inherently a cooperative effort, in-
volving an understanding of the actions and motivations of all of the par-
ticipants in the event (including trainers and supervisors who may not
have been on the scene).
To be sure, the accountability mechanisms and redress mechanisms
described in the preceding paragraphs are necessary and important.  In-
nocent civilians injured in an OIS should be fairly, appropriately, and rap-
idly compensated for their injuries and suffering.  Furthermore, to the
extent a police officer committed a violation—that is, an intentional de-
parture from established rules or norms of safety—retrospective accounta-
bility measures may be effective in deterring future intentional behavior.
To the extent that one of the goals of post-hoc accountability reviews
is to reduce the frequency of future shootings, however, they are only use-
ful to address that limited subset of intentional violations.  By definition,
post-hoc accountability mechanisms cannot deter unintentional error, as
the error was made for reasons having nothing to do with the fear of dis-
covery or discipline.
Furthermore, current retrospective review mechanisms can en-
courage an unhelpful hindsight, leading to a mistaken belief that the fac-
tors causing the undesired outcome have been addressed.  The familiar
phrase “Monday morning quarterbacking” is both symbolically and liter-
ally useful in this context.  When an NFL quarterback throws an intercep-
tion, for example, it is easy for observers and pundits to blame the person
who threw the ball and question his proficiency and his fitness for the role.
Coaches, quarterbacks, and other players on the team, however, know the
truth: every NFL quarterback is one of the very best in the world at his
craft, and has been painstakingly trained by the most accomplished train-
ers in his field.  In the midst of a football play, with twenty-two men mak-
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ing instantaneous decisions in concert with one another towards divergent
goals based on dynamic information, it is possible for the quarterback to
misread a signal, or for another player to fail to pick up a blitz, or for an
opponent to disrupt an expected opening.  In these situations, the
quarterback may believe that a specific pass leads to his best possible out-
come, only to experience the unintended consequence of an interception.
It may be that the quarterback bears responsibility for the interception; it
seems unlikely that the responsibility is his alone.  And while judgment
and criticism can encourage increased focus for the next play, they do
little to address the play design, practice, field conditions, and execution
of the other twenty-one people on the field.  Accordingly, benching your
quarterback is unlikely to ensure that the next quarterback who runs that
play will experience a different result.
In such an environment, errors enabled by systemic and environmen-
tal factors must be clearly understood, and distinguished from violations.
This is where RCA provides unique awareness.
III. A SYSTEMS VIEW OF OFFICER-INVOLVED SHOOTINGS
Existing review mechanisms are designed to determine who should be
held accountable for the shooting—the officer, the individual who was
shot, or some third party.55  These procedures may be useful to the extent
that our goal is to assess whether the officer departed from existing proce-
dures, or other facts useful in assessing blame or appropriate compensa-
tion for the OIS.  If, on the other hand, our goal is to prevent OIS over
time, then retrospective accountability assessments are necessary but not
sufficient to achieve our goal.  Their focus on individual culpability and
existing policies and procedures will identify officer departures from pro-
cedures, and may deter that subset of those departures that is done know-
ingly.  But they will fail to reduce the incidence of accidental or
unintentional acts contributing to the OIS.  More importantly, they fail to
address the reality that the vast majority of OIS occur despite the fact that no one
wants then to occur.  Neither the officer pulling the trigger nor (certainly)
the victim desires the OIS—but through a sequence of contributing
events, the participants reach a moment where the officer feels that pull-
ing the trigger is the most positive next action.  Without understanding
these multiple contributing factors—involving the environment, informa-
tion flow, situation assessment, supervision, training, and potentially doz-
ens of other factors that combine to enable an OIS to occur despite the
best desires of the participating individuals—we cannot hope to interrupt
that sequence for the next officer and prevent injury to the next OIS
victim.
There are many ways to catalogue systemic errors (i.e., unintended
outcomes) and violations (e.g., deliberate or intentional departures from
55. For a discussion of existing review mechanisms, see supra notes 43–50 and
accompanying text.
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system rules).  The framework of errors and violations provided by Dr.
James T. Reason is particularly helpful in understanding the myriad con-
tributing factors that allowed the error to occur, permitting the design of
useful preventative measures to avoid recreation of the error in similar
circumstances in the future.56
A. Identifying and Addressing Error in a System: James Reason’s
Swiss Cheese Model
At its highest level, policing is a system of human interaction designed
to protect our communities from crime.  In any such system of human
interaction, mistakes will be made.  While intentional departures from the
system’s rules of safety can occur, it is more likely that errors—whether
called, accidents, adverse events, unintended outcomes, or (in the forensic
laboratory context) protocol “nonconformities”—occur not because of an
actor’s devious manipulations, but rather despite their intentions and best
efforts, and despite existing protocols and safety checks and balances de-
signed to prevent those errors.57  As organizational management expert
James Reason says, “Humans are fallible and errors are to be expected,
even in the best organisations.”58  In a “systems approach” to error reduc-
tion, errors are seen as consequences of environmental or upstream sys-
temic factors that must be addressed to prevent the recurrence of the
circumstances that led to the unintended outcome.59  Systemic defenses,
however, remain prone to errors that may persist at multiple defense
levels.
Reason’s oft-cited Swiss Cheese Model of error presents an elegant
illustration of the challenge.60  In Reason’s model, our system (in this
case, policing) can be thought of as a block of Swiss cheese.61  The system
starts with police initiating (or responding to) a community interaction,
and proceeds through various stages: individual stops, arrests, bookings,
interrogations, case adjudication, incarceration, parole, etc.  Each of these
person-to-person interactions between law enforcement and civilian can
be thought of as a single slice in that block of cheese, and each interaction
includes opportunities for error, represented by holes in the Swiss
cheese.62
56. See Reason, supra note 6, at 769–70; see also NAT’L COMM’N ON FORENSIC
SCI., supra note 11, at 5–7.
57. See Reason, supra note 6, at 768.
58. See id. at 768.
59. See id. (“Countermeasures are based on the assumption that though we
cannot change the human condition, we can change the conditions under which
humans work.”).
60. See id. at 769. (proposing the Swiss-cheese model for systemic failure).
61. See id. (demonstrating how holes between layers can align).
62. See id. at 769 (“Usually, [failure] can happen only when the holes in many
layers momentarily line up to permit a trajectory of accident opportunity . . . .”).
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Normally, when an error occurs, that error is identified and resolved
by a later, or downstream, component of the system.63  To address the risk
of error by officers or detectives leading an investigation phase, for exam-
ple, most police departments will require an independent case review by a
police sergeant prior to booking.64  This review ensures that the investiga-
tion has yielded an accurate arrest of the actual perpetrator of a crime
using techniques permissible under the Constitution, and that the charges
filed match the conduct observed by the arresting officer.  The sergeant’s
review ensures that errors that proceed through the “hole” in our Swiss
cheese slice for the investigation do not continue farther into our process.
In any effective system, other checks and balances, or “safety stops,”
are implemented throughout the system for the express purpose of im-
proving safety and reducing errors.65  This is true in policing as well, both
generally and in the OIS context specifically.  Examples of checks and bal-
ances designed to reduce OIS might include the provision of non-lethal
restraints (handcuffs, tasers), training on methods of event de-escalation,
rules of conduct (i.e., prohibitions on shooting at moving vehicles), and
others.
Despite our best efforts, however, from time to time a situation will
arise in which an error occurs and is supported by either additional down-
stream errors or the failure of checks and balances to work as intended.66
In these cases, errors bypass defense systems, causing damage to victims.67
In extreme cases (e.g., the Challenger space shuttle explosion, the
Chernobyl nuclear meltdown,68 a “wrong-side” surgery, or some other
type of “never event” that a system insists must not be permitted to occur),
we may call the resulting catastrophe a “sentinel event.”69  Sentinel events
are sufficiently serious that they typically galvanize a system to undertake a
substantial top-to-bottom, multi-stakeholder review of all contributing fac-
tors, because all participants can acknowledge that the system’s ongoing
legitimacy is threatened if such events are allowed to recur.70  It is our
contention that the OIS falls in this category.
63. See id. (citing high technology systems as examples of defenses in layers
that are effective in protecting potential victims from systemic failures, but also
noting that such systems nevertheless have their own weaknesses).
64. See, e.g., CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., supra note 17, at 16.
65. See Reason, supra note 6, at 770 (explaining how “high reliability organisa-
tions” routinely rehearse familiar error scenarios while constantly checking for new
errors).
66. See id. at 769.
67. See id.
68. See id. at 768–69.
69. See id.; THE JOINT COMM’N, SENTINEL EVENTS (SE) 2012 COMPREHENSIVE
ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS 1 (Jan. 2013), https://www.jointcommis-
sion.org/assets/1/6/CAMH_2012_Update2_24_SE.pdf [hereinafter SENTINEL
EVENTS] (“A sentinel event is an unexpected occurrence involving death or serious
physical or psychological injury, or the risk thereof.  Serious injury specifically in-
cludes loss of limb or function.”).
70. See SENTINEL EVENTS, supra note 69, at 15–16.
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B. Active and Latent Errors
Of course, there are as many potential errors as there are potential
actions or reactions in a system, and understanding the nature of the spe-
cific error is key to solving it.  An intentional departure from protocol
caused by corruption requires an understanding of the motivation for the
corruption, and may lead to both discipline for the corrupt individual and
a modification of the system to remove the incentive(s) in question.  Such
solutions would have less effect in addressing unintentional or “good
faith” errors, even if they lead to the same outcome.
To address this, and to aid in designing useful interventions to pre-
vent errors, Reason has created a lexicon of system errors.71  He first di-
vides the universe into errors (good-faith, unsafe acts based on skill and
training) and violations (willful disregard of rules and regulations).72  Er-
rors can then be subcategorized as “active errors” (unsafe acts committed
by people in direct contact with the system) and “latent errors” (inevitable
problems that stem from system design, environmental factors or manage-
ment decisions).73  This division accounts for the ways in with both indi-
vidual performance and systemic design can lead to unsafe acts.
C. Systemic Errors
An error is based on skill and training issues affects the judgment of
front-line actors, such as individual police officers.74  They may be deci-
sional, perceptual, or skill errors.
Reason’s work includes a lexicon of potential errors, including errors
of flawed decision-making, mistaken perceptions, and skill-based errors,
and evaluating errors of action and omission, as well as errors impacted by
supervision or environmental tendencies.75  Decisional errors are errors
characterized by a lack of information, knowledge, or experience, or the
misinterpretation of existing information,76 such as misinterpreting a sus-
pect’s attempt at compliance for threatening behavior.  Perceptual errors
are those resulting from a lack of sensory input,77 such as patrolling in a
dark stairwell.  Skill errors are errors resulting from an officer engaging in
71. See Reason, supra note 6, at 768 (describing the longstanding approach of
dividing unsafe acts by the most closely situated employees into errors and viola-
tions under the person approach).
72. See id; see also NAT’L COMM’N ON FORENSIC SCI., supra note 11, at 5.
73. See Reason, supra note 6, at 769.
74. See NAT’L COMM’N ON FORENSIC SCI., supra note 11, at 5; cf. FAA Aviation
Safety Information Analysis and Sharing, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., http://www. asias.faa
.gov/pls/apex/f?p=100:1 [https://perma.cc/HP3S-X4WH] (last visited Oct. 30,
2017).
75. See NAT’L COMM’N ON FORENSIC SCI., supra note 11, at 5.
76. See Reason, supra note 6, at 768; NAT’L COMM’N ON FORENSIC SCI., supra
note 11, at 5.
77. See Reason, supra note 6, at 769; NAT’L COMM’N ON FORENSIC SCI., supra
note 11, at 5.
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a familiar task, focused on a comfortable situation that nonetheless turns
out differently than expected,78 such as approaching from the wrong an-
gle during a traffic stop that causes the officer to be struck by a passing
car.
D. Systemic Violations
“Violations,” in the Reason lexicon, is used to describe instances in
which an actor willfully disregards established procedures and customs,
whether for a nefarious purpose (corruption) or for a perceived efficiency
(workarounds, or “cutting corners” in procedure).79  A “routine” violation
is a habitual and repeated departure from accepted practice, enabled by
rule bending,80 such as neglecting to check on detained prisoners as fre-
quently as is mandated.  An “exceptional” violation, on the other hand, is
a willful departure from accepted practice that is not condoned by man-
agement81—beating a suspect to coerce a confession, for example, or as a
punishment for an infraction against the officer or the community.
IV. ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS: FORWARD-LOOKING EVENT REVIEW
TO PREVENT OIS OVER TIME
RCA can be a useful addition to the accountability-based options for
post-event review described above.  It is a systematic process for identifying
the “root causes” of problems or events and an approach for responding
to them.82  A root cause is “a factor that caused a nonconformance and
should be permanently eliminated through process improvement.”83  As
Figure 1 illustrates, it is often buried several levels below the proximate
cause of an unintended event, mistake, error, accident, nonconformance,
or other negative occurrence, and is “ ‘the evil at the bottom’ that sets in
motion the entire cause-and-effect chain causing the problem(s).”84  Even
generally safe organizations are subject to adverse events, and even unsafe
systems may escape detection for extended periods of time.85
78. See NAT’L COMM’N ON FORENSIC SCI., supra note 11, at 5.
79. See id. at 5–6; cf. FED. AVIATION ADMIN., supra note 74.
80. See NAT’L COMM’N ON FORENSIC SCI., supra note 11, at 5.
81. See id.
82. See generally id.
83. See What Is Root Cause Analysis (RCA)?, supra note 2.
84. See id.
85. See NAT’L COMM’N ON FORENSIC SCI., supra note 11, at 4.
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FIGURE 1. ROOT CAUSE VISUALIZED86
RCA is based on the idea that effective management requires more
than merely “putting out fires” for problems that develop, but also finding
a way to prevent them.87  In contrast with accountability reviews, RCA is
largely unconcerned with compensating individuals who may have suf-
fered an injury because of the error.88  In addition, questions of who is to
blame or who should accept responsibility for the error are at best second-
tier assessments.  Rather, RCA is focused on identifying the contributing
factors that allowed a mistake, error, or adverse event to occur so that
those contributing factors can be addressed and improved.89  RCA is a
learning tool that identifies the causes of systemic errors, creates action
plans to prevent recurrences, and identifies necessary systemic changes to
reduce risk.90
RCA operates without the presumption that someone is “blamewor-
thy.”91  Its presumption of good faith participation in the system, and its
emphasis on prevention rather than punishment92 have led other indus-
tries to employ RCA successfully to reduce catastrophic recurrences with
86. What Is Root Cause Analysis (RCA)?, supra note 2.
87. See, e.g., Using Root Cause Analysis to Instill a Culture of Self-Improvement: Pro-
gram Replication Materials, supra note 20, at 4.
88. Hence the need for separate compensatory mechanisms, e.g. civil litiga-
tion or professional insurance.
89. See NAT’L COMM’N ON FORENSIC SCI., supra note 11, at 5.
90. See id. at 5–7.
91. See id. at 5.
92. For intentional or reckless behavior, a RCA including a “just culture”
would suggest both improving deterrent or preventative measures and including
accountability mechanisms designed to deter the intentional misconduct. See, e.g.,
Using Root Cause Analysis to Instill a Culture of Self-Improvement: Program Replication
Materials, supra note 20, at 5.  An example of this might be increasing video surveil-
lance of an evidence locker where evidence is being mishandled, while also in-
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as much information as possible.  These different industries apply RCA
with the assumption that their equivalent “catastrophic events” (e.g., air-
line crashes) are unacceptable tragedies that should never be an outcome
of a properly functioning system.93  The blame-free analysis is crucial to
RCA because blaming and punishing people with good intentions for ad-
verse events alienates the very people who may be in the best position to
prevent the problem from occurring, or have the most relevant knowledge
of how to design solutions.94
One way to think of the difference between the accountability-based
approaches (e.g., internal affairs, civilian oversight boards, or civil litiga-
tion) and RCA as problem-solving approaches is that the accountability
approaches are focused on who should be accountable for what behaviors
in the past, while the RCA is much more consumed with why an individual
acted in the way he did given the information available to him at the time
to modify the actions of others in the future.95  This focus on understand-
ing why an actor makes the decisions he does is reflected in one of the
most common tools of RCA investigation, called simply the “Five Whys.”96
The individual conducting the RCA asks participants to answer increas-
ingly deeper levels of the question “why” until true base contributing fac-
tors are revealed.  Often, these basic contributing factors would have been
hidden had the successive “why” questions not been asked, as shown in
this example from the auto industry:
PROBLEM: The vehicle will not start.
WHY? The battery is dead.
WHY? The alternator is not working.
WHY? The alternator belt is broken.
WHY? The alternator belt was worn past its useful lifespan and
not replaced.
WHY? The vehicle was not regularly maintained.
SOLUTION: Schedule regular maintenance checks.97
An incapacitated car is an obviously undesirable outcome—and the
proximate cause of this particular incapacitation is a dead battery.  With-
out digging deeper, however, we might simply replace the battery, or the
alternator belt, and continue onward.  While this would solve the instant
creasing the penalty for an officer found to have intentionally removed evidence
for improper use.
93. See NAT’L COMM’N ON FORENSIC SCI., supra note 11, at 4–5.
94. See id. at 5.
95. See Guidance for Performing Root Cause Analysis (RCA) with Performance Im-
provement Projects (PIPs), QUALITY ASSURANCE & PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENT, https:/
/www.cms.gov/medicare/provider-enrollment-and-certification/qapi/downloads/
guidanceforrca.pdf [https://perma.cc/U5TK-VXWH] (last visited Aug. 13, 2017).
96. See id.
97. See Daryl L.L. Houston, Why, Why, Why, Why, and Why, DAILY POST (May 31,
2012), https://dailypost.wordpress.com/2012/05/31/why-why-why-why-and-why/
[https://perma.cc/5XKL-FZ6E].
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issue, if we have not learned the benefit of regular maintenance, we will
certainly repeat our broken alternator belt in the future.  Note, too, that
another potential action might be to take the car to a different mechanic
in the future—but “firing” the mechanic would likewise be useless to re-
solve problems that are actually caused by a lack of regular maintenance.
Only by asking “why” five levels deep can we truly understand the root
causes of the problem, and only after the root causes are clearly identified
can a system participant (in this case the driver) take useful corrective
actions (precise system maintenance) that will prevent the recurrence of
the undesired outcome.  Corrective actions minimize or eliminate the risk
of repeating nonconformity once it has been identified.98  Discovery of
systemic problems also enables preventative actions, which proactively
identify needed improvements and sources of nonconformities.99  In prac-
tice, these actions can take the form of guidance, training, focused investi-
gations, recommendations, communication, implementing safe harbors,
and increased documentation.100
A. RCA as Part of Systems Quality Improvement
FIGURE 2. QUALITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS VISUALIZED101
98. See NAT’L COMM’N ON FORENSIC SCI., supra note 11, at 1.
99. See id. at 4.
100. See id. at 2.
101. Quality Management Concepts, BIS. ONLINE LEARNING, http://www.busi-
ness-online-learning.com/quality-management-concepts.html [https://perma.cc/
UUU6-U28L] (last visited Oct. 31, 2017).
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As Figure 2 illustrates, quality is an iterative process of defining how a
system is supposed to work and comparing the outcomes to the satisfac-
tion of “customers”—people who use the system.  One can think of polic-
ing as a system of human interactions designed to reduce crime and
support public safety.  Using this as our definition, a “high-quality” crimi-
nal justice system, or a “high-quality” system of policing within the criminal
justice system, is one that achieves these goals while maximizing civilian
liberty.  In this model, improving policing occurs as an iterative cycle: the
police devise protocols that are designed to reduce crime and protect civil-
ians, while customers—defined here not only as members of the commu-
nity, but also as witnesses, suspects, perpetrators of crime, and police
officers themselves—provide feedback on the effectiveness and utility of
the protocols.
In an OIS, we can see the competing requirements of the different
stakeholders.  Police need to be able to prevent crime and to protect the
citizenry.  Citizens, even those perpetrating crime, deserve the protection
of their bodily integrity.  Of course, this includes police officers as well.  It
is foreseeable that the perpetrator of a crime, when confronted by a police
officer seeking to prevent that crime, might react with force directed to-
wards the police officer, creating a danger for the officer.  Thus, we have
designed protocols informed by past events that are designed to prevent
the officer from initiating physical force and will allow the officer to re-
spond with the minimum amount of force necessary to (a) protect the
officer’s bodily integrity and (b) minimize the potential for injury both to
uninvolved individuals and to the individual posing a physical threat to the
officer.
In this context, any injury to any individual could be (and we believe
should be) defined as an “error” from the systems perspective.102  Thus, we
can recognize that a police shooting may have been both deliberate by the
officer and unavoidable under the circumstances, while at the same time
labeling the injury as an “error” from the perspective of the system as a
whole.  When an officer follows all established protocols and nonetheless
discharges his firearm in the proportionate use of force or self-defense,
the officer has acted correctly, but the system has failed.  An administrative
review would stop here and rule that no further action is necessary.  An
RCA, on the other hand, would ask, “Why did the officer need to dis-
charge his weapon?” and would seek to construct a different environment
in which the escalation to force could be avoided without allowing the
perpetrator of a crime to avoid capture and accountability.  In other
words, while administrative reviews of the Ferguson, Missouri shooting fo-
cused on the blameworthy aspects of Michael Brown’s and Darren Wil-
son’s actions, and on the appropriateness of the Ferguson prosecutor’s
102. Whether we ultimately believe that physical injury is useful as a punish-
ment to the perpetrator of a crime is up to the community; the instant point is
limited to the police/individual interaction during investigation or upon discovery
of a crime.
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management of a grand jury; an RCA of the Ferguson shooting would seek
to identify moments during the build-up to the explosive interaction in
which the system could have provided support to each man that might
have avoided a confrontation that ended with one young man bleeding to
death in the street, and another as an unemployed former police officer
and community pariah.
The policies and procedures that are in place as of the date of the
event being reviewed provide the starting point of a RCA, and the task is to
determine which, if any of these policies and procedures, can be modified
to incorporate the learnings from the event to prevent the next unin-
tended outcome.  One of two possibilities exist.  Either policy was not fol-
lowed, in which case we need to understand why not, and propose
modifications that will increase conformance to the existing protocols; or
policy was followed, in which case the policy was not adequate to prevent
the unintended outcome, and we need to design improvements that will
ensure the policy covers this new and unexpected scenario.
By way of example, suppose that standing department policy on trans-
porting arrestees was not followed in an incident that resulted in the death
of an arrestee.103  The violation would suggest that RCA on the decision-
making of the involved officers would be helpful in determining exactly
why they made decisions inconsistent with department policy.
B. Non-Blaming Review
A fundamental difference between RCA and existing methods of re-
view is that RCA does not presume that the root cause is an individual
capable of legal blame and consequences.104  This does not mean that
individual culpability should not be assessed—but the purpose of an RCA
is to change future behavior by preventing the occurrence of the undesired
event, not to assess blame, punishment, or discipline for prior actions.
Thus, in the event the RCA discovers intentional wrongdoing by any sys-
tem participant, the information should be passed on to appropriate indi-
viduals with disciplinary ability, while the RCA will continue to devise
checks and balances making both misconduct and error harder to
achieve.105
103. See, e.g., Mariam Khan, Prosecutors Say Baltimore Police Officer Edward Nero
Did Not Follow Protocols with Freddie Gray, ABC NEWS (May 12, 2016, 10:19 PM),
http://abcnews.go.com/US/prosecutors-baltimore-police-officer-edward-nero-fol-
low-protocols/story?id=39064198 [https://perma.cc/Z55F-5HVR]; Donna Owens,
Baltimore Cop Failed to Follow Protocol: Freddie Gray Prosecutor, REUTERS (May 12, 2016,
06:25 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-baltimore-police-idUSKCN0Y317R
[https://perma.cc/8LXA-9PBN] .
104. See NAT’L COMM’N ON FORENSIC SCI., supra note 11, at 5 (highlighting
that RCA is blame-free analysis).
105. See id. at 8 (stating disciplinary processes should be separate from RCA
and appropriate persons involved in disciplinary action should be informed).
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Part of the reason for a non-blaming perspective is to encourage indi-
viduals to participate fully and openly; after all, it is safe to assume that
participation in an accountability review with the potential for disciplinary
or other punitive action will create an incentive for the individual being
investigated to minimize his or her role in the incident, with potentially
catastrophic impact to our ability to understand the genesis of the unin-
tended outcome and thus to prevent its recurrence.106
C. Who Should Participate in a RCA?
RCAs work best as multi-stakeholder processes with a coordinator or a
moderator.107  RCAs are best performed by an interdisciplinary team that
understands the various roles and working environments of all of the indi-
viduals who participated in the event.108  This allows the group to benefit
from multiple perspectives and multidisciplinary personnel whose back-
grounds encompass the various parts of the technical analysis and manage-
ment systems, and ensure a holistic review of contributing factors that
might otherwise be overlooked.
The number of participants conducting the RCA can vary depending
on the nature of the event, though most scholars recommend a group of
four to ten people.109  For more substantial events, RCAs often work best
when performed by multidisciplinary teams, from all levels of staff, with
fundamental knowledge of the specific area involved.110  For example, an
RCA when performed after an airplane crash might include experts in air
traffic control procedures, mechanical engineering, meteorology, human
factors in instrumentation design, aviation safety procedures, etc.
The RCA team typically is made up of people who did not themselves
participate in the specific incident, to ensure objectivity in the review—but
it is essential that as many of the actual participants as possible also partici-
pate in the RCA, to truly understand what they were thinking in then-
current terms as they made decisions that contributed to the progression
of the event.
D. Barriers to RCA
The administrative review processes described above—particularly
civil or criminal litigation—may actually serve as a barrier to the conduct
of a robust RCA if information generated by the RCA is immediately acces-
106. See Interview with Sean Smoot, Director and Chief Counsel for the Police
Benevolent & Protective Association of Illinois and the Police Benevolent Labor
Committee (Feb. 21, 2017).
107. NAT’L COMM’N ON FORENSIC SCI., supra note 11, at 7–8.
108. See id.
109. See Guidance for Performing Root Cause Analysis (RCA) with Performance Im-
provement Projects (PIPs), supra note 95.
110. See NAT’L COMM’N ON FORENSIC SCI., supra note 11, at 7–8; see also Gui-
dance for Performing Root Cause Analysis (RCA) with Performance Improvement Projects
(PIPs), supra note 95.
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sible to plaintiff’s counsel in a civil litigation.  To maximize a jurisdiction’s
enthusiasm for RCA, then, we may benefit from certain “safe harbor”
protections.
Similar protections are provided in the medical and transportation
contexts,111 which have recognized that the goals of an RCA—that is, en-
couraging the reporting of unintended outcomes and participation in re-
views—are furthered by providing criminal justice professionals with
limited protections in exchange for their candor on conduct that could
result in disciplinary measures being taken against the reporting individ-
ual.  Without these protections, those administering the RCA run a risk
that those officers most directly involved in the event may not provide fully
accurate information about the event and won’t be motivated to fully par-
ticipate, thereby reducing the utility of the RCA in identifying how things
really work and what really happened.
E. Overcoming Barriers with Participation Incentives: Non-Disciplinary Review,
Confidentiality, and Transparency
In a perfect world, RCAs should be isolated from internal event re-
views focused on accountability and discipline.  In aviation, for example,
the Aviation Safety and Reporting System (ASRS) has been established to
conduct event reviews using anonymized data collection and reporting
techniques.112  Individuals who report safety concerns to the ASRS are
given an anonymized receipt in exchange for providing information about
the event; if the Federal Aviation Administration, a regulatory agency with
disciplinary authority, follows up with the individual, the individual can
111. RCA in a health care context benefits from Peer Review Protection Acts,
laws in many states that protect the privacy of participants, provide immunity for
their good faith statements made in a RCA, and limit the disclosure of information
from the RCA that is provided to external observers. See, e.g., Peer Review Protec-
tion Act, 63 PA. STAT. AND CONST. STAT. ANN. § 425.3 (West 2017).  This allows
medical professionals participating in an RCA, with the goal of improving the over-
all quality and safety of the system, to do so without threat of prosecution or disci-
pline for their participation in the review, and without the fear that their
statements will later be disclosed to the press or a plaintiff’s attorney.  Note that
these peer review protection acts do nothing to disrupt the ability of any plaintiff
or victim to pursue appropriate remedies in court, which may include the separate
deposition or other interview of the individuals participating in the RCA.  A
slightly different approach has been taken in the transportation field, where the
NTSB’s conclusions and data are public and available, but not admissible as evi-
dence, forcing plaintiffs’ counsel to hire their own experts to analyze the data gath-
ered by the NTSB and reach their own independent conclusions.
112. See, e.g., Confidentiality and Incentives to Report, AVIATION SAFETY REPORTING
SYS., https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/overview/confidentiality.html [https://perma.cc/
KZN3-7ART] (last visited Aug. 12, 2017) [hereinafter Confidentiality and Incentives to
Report] (discussing ASRS procedure for reviewing reports); see also Immunity Policies,
AVIATION SAFETY REPORTING SYS., https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/overview/immunity
.html [https://perma.cc/62B4-TEPU] (last visited Aug. 12, 2017) [hereinafter Im-
munity Policies].
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produce the ASRS receipt and receive qualified immunity in exchange for
his contribution to improving the safety of the overall system.113
Another incentive to participation shown in the ASRS process is confi-
dentiality.114  While the events are known, it may behoove the organiza-
tion to anonymize interviews, and to shield personally identifiable
information from evaluations or reports about the event to ensure that
individuals feel free to participate fully.  At the same time, it is essential
that the final assessment of why the event occurred, listing the various con-
tributing factors and proposing solutions to prevent those facts from oc-
curring in the future, be published and shared widely, so that other
jurisdictions can learn from the errors contained in the report rather than
having to relive them.115  Thus, departments conducting and reviewing
RCAs should willingly agree to exclude the RCA investigation and report
from being used as evidence in any employment proceedings involving the
participating officer(s).  Note that those evaluations can continue unfet-
tered but would be barred from piggybacking upon the RCA investigation
and would instead have to conduct their own independent investigations.
In this way, incentives to provide incomplete information to the RCA are
removed, while the system’s overall ability to allocate appropriate account-
ability and recompense remains uninhibited.116
F. Timeliness of RCAs
As with most things involving memory, RCAs are best performed as
proximate to the occurrence in question as possible.  RCA investigators
benefit from access to critical information at the time of incident, before
self-protection incentives threaten to alter or distort accounts and data sur-
rounding a shooting.117
Notwithstanding this desire for proximity of time, RCA can be useful
in a criminal justice setting when conducted years, or even decades after
the event itself.118  The closer the RCA is to the event itself, however, the
more useful it will be in identifying contributing factors and proposing
and implementing useful reforms.  The good news about an OIS as op-
posed to other potential errors in criminal justice (e.g., a wrongful convic-
tion) is that the OIS is identified at the moment it occurs, while wrongful
arrests or convictions often cannot be identified for years or decades.
113. See Immunity Policies, supra note 112.
114. See Confidentiality and Incentives to Report, supra note 112; Immunity Policies,
supra note 112.
115. See Interview with Sean Smoot, supra note 106.
116. See id.
117. See id.
118. Cf. John Hollway, A Systems Approach to Error Reduction in Criminal Justice
11–15, PENN LAW: LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP REPOSITORY (Feb. 2014), http://scholarship
.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1975&context=faculty_scholarship
[https://perma.cc/W2XC-LZXN].
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G. When to Conduct an RCA
While all errors should be critically evaluated, not all errors rise to the
level of a full, multi-stakeholder RCA.  A police officer putting the wrong
date on a report, while technically an error, does not rise to the level of
the acts and omissions that occurred during the shooting of Michael
Brown in Ferguson, Missouri for example.  To determine when RCA is
appropriate, the National Commission on Forensic Science (NCFS) imple-
ments a matrix that charts the severity and frequency of unsafe acts.119
FIGURE 3. WHEN TO CONDUCT RCA120
As Figure 3 illustrates, the need to conduct a full-blown RCA depends
on both the severity of the error (i.e., the injury inflicted) and its likeli-
hood of recurrence.  RCAs should be used to evaluate all catastrophic
events, while other frequent errors (e.g., entering the wrong date in the
notes of a witness interview) may not require such a detailed event review.
This differentiation is necessary to minimize the inefficient use of re-
sources that could occur.
H. The Role of “Near Misses” in RCAs
RCA also offers advantages in data collection over existing review sys-
tems by analyzing “near misses.”  A near miss is a narrowly averted error,
one that that would have occurred but for a fortuitous event that allowed
the error to be detected in time and avoided.121  Because all of the neces-
sary prerequisites for the error occurred, but the psychological barrier of
the error’s actual occurrence has been avoided, the near miss can be an
119. See NAT’L COMM’N ON FORENSIC SCI., supra note 11, at 10.
120. Id.
121. See, e.g., James M. Doyle, Learning from Error in American Criminal Justice,
100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 109, 129 (2010).
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extremely valuable learning tool, and should be studied in exactly the way
it would be studied if the undesired event had actually occurred.
Examples of near misses might include errors (e.g., arresting the
wrong person), violations (e.g., depriving an arrestee of due process), and
situations when officers narrowly avoid being injured or killed (e.g., an
officer is nearly shot while executing an arrest warrant).122  When these
near misses are treated as actual errors, they can be excellent training
tools, providing all of the opportunities for learning about error without
the reluctance of participants to tell their stories for fear of consequences
in the parallel administrative and civil accountability processes.
In an officer’s interactions with civilians, systemic and human factors
may elevate the risk of violence but not necessarily result in violence oc-
curring.  Because accountability reviews only begin after an incident has
occurred, they are inadequate in reviewing risky conduct that before it
culminates in an incident.  By examining “near misses,” RCA can identify
risky patterns of conduct with specific offices and individual officers to
enable policy adjustments to prevent the next shooting.  Thus, near misses
should be studied in RCA analysis as if they were real errors.123
V. BENEFITS OF ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS IN POLICING
A. Increased Disclosure Leads to More Accurate Solutions
In theory, the separation of RCA from accountability review systems
will encourage more disclosure by all parties involved.124  With greater in-
formation comes greater accuracy in the implementation of systemic re-
forms.125  Instead of solutions focused on the accountability of individual
officers, RCA allows the creation of systemic solutions that address habit-
ual rule-bending, perpetuators of reckless office culture, and training defi-
ciencies among officers.  Potential examples in the Ferguson shooting
might be: recommendations to improve the cultural awareness of Fergu-
son police officers with regard to the needs of or situations of individuals
in the community; requirements that all Ferguson Police Department of-
ficers carry non-lethal forms of restraint (e.g., tasers); protocols that pre-
scribe additional distance between officers apprehending suspects using
their vehicles as barriers; additional training on de-escalation protocols;
the use of dashboard or body cameras; requirements that all patrols con-
sist of two officers rather than just one; and other possible recommenda-
tions.126  Any of these might have allowed for a different result in the
shooting of Michael Brown.
122. See Interview with Sean Smoot, supra note 106.
123. See NAT’L COMM’N ON FORENSIC SCI., supra note 11, at 2 n.2, 10 n.11, 11.
124. Compare Reason, supra note 6, at 768, with CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING
SERVS., supra note 17, at 15–20.
125. See, e.g., Hollway, supra note 118, at 17–19.
126. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DE-
PARTMENT 90–102 (2015), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-
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B. Quality Improvements over Time, Leading to Greater Safety
for Officers and Citizens
To the surprise of no one, the conduct of RCAs will not immediately
stop all errors from occurring.  Rather, RCAs function as part of a mature
and productive safety improvement and quality management system to
identify risks in the system and mitigate those risks going forward.  Thus,
the system becomes safer for all who participate in it in a gradual process
over time.  It is through the application of RCA and other associated initia-
tives over more than forty years that crashes in aviation, as Figure 4 illus-
trates, have declined to very near zero.  At the same time, it is worth noting
two important facts: first, while the rate of accidents in aviation may be
near zero, the perfection of zero errors has yet to be achieved, and likely
never will be achieved.127  Second, the reduction in accidents was not im-
mediate, but rather a gradual decline over the past four decades.128  Re-
ducing OIS and improving officer and civilian safety will likewise happen
over time, through the persistent and iterative application of RCA and the
conscious implementation of reforms.
U.S. and Canadian Operators Accident Rates by Year
Fatal Accidents | Worldwide Commercial Jet Fleet | 1959 through 2016
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FIGURE 4. DECLINE IN U.S. AND CANADIAN AVIATION ACCIDENTS BY YEAR129
releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6ZNT-L63X] [hereinafter DOJ FERGUSON REPORT].
127. See BOEING, supra note 7, at 17 (identifying U.S. and Canadian operators’
accident rates by year).
128. See id. (showing gradual decline of accidents).
129. Id.
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RCA is also a powerful tool in maintaining active awareness of best
practices.130  By accounting for the near misses that are often overlooked
by the system, RCA provides officers with training opportunities that react
to their experiences in the field in real-time.  This should both minimize
the recurrence of dangerous scenarios (e.g., situations where officers draw
their firearms on civilians), and help officers avoid situations where their
own lives may be jeopardized by risky behavior.  Institutions that use RCA
to learn from prior OIS can implement both environmental modifications
and individualized training that will help officers see farther ahead, identi-
fying situations more likely to escalate to a shooting, and reducing the
exposure of officers and civilians to danger by knowing when to de-esca-
late, when to call for support, or when non-lethal force is the obvious
answer.131
B. RCAs Contribute to Procedural Justice and Police Legitimacy
The rigor of RCA and its systematic application have great potential
to improve the legitimacy of the police and restore the public’s confidence
in policing.  Despite a more effective, better equipped, and organized law
enforcement apparatus, the public’s confidence in law enforcement has
stagnated and even dropped, particularly in communities of color.132  As
community videotaping of events becomes more and more prevalent, and
public awareness of police encounters through social media soars, it is in-
creasingly the case that an inappropriate OIS in one jurisdiction serves to
increase citizen skepticism of officer interactions in all jurisdictions—thus,
a low quality interaction in Ferguson contributes to citizen anger in Phila-
delphia, which has the potential to put Philadelphia police officers at in-
creased risk of an explosive interaction through no fault of their own.
This confidence gap traces to a pervasive sentiment that the police do not
offer procedural justice and uniform treatment under the law.133  Such a
130. See, e.g., FED. AVIATION ADMIN., supra note 74.
131. The Philando Castile shooting in Falcon Heights, Minnesota serves as a
tragic example of the failure to identify a dangerous situation until too late. See,
e.g., Mitch Smith, Minnesota Officer Acquitted in Killing of Philando Castile, N.Y. TIMES
(June 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/16/us/police-shooting-trial-
philando-castile.html [https://perma.cc/N7GL-GP9Y].  This OIS evolved from an
innocuous traffic stop due to a broken brake light.  Mr. Castile, the driver, identi-
fied himself and stated that he had a concealed weapon in the car—for which he
had a permit.  The police officer immediately moved into a personal protection
mode, aggressively telling Mr. Castile not to pull out the weapon.  Mr. Castile con-
tinued moving, and the officer fired seven shots into the car, killing Mr. Castile.
Had the officer stepped back and into a position of physical safety, and had Mr.
Castile fully stopped all movements until the officer had regained his calm, this
tragedy could have been avoided.  What other factors were involved in this inci-
dent?  An RCA is needed to understand how best to learn from this event, which is
repeated on American streets every day.
132. See PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING, supra note 54, at
9.
133. See id. at 12–13.
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risk is not lost on the Philadelphia police, of course, and their conduct
reflects an increased level of fear and tension, which is both directly injuri-
ous to the police and further inflames the situation.
1. Respect and Legitimacy
In many communities in America, civilians view the police with dis-
trust over a perceived lack of accountability and lack of transparency.134
Ironically, the many accountability review systems in place fail to suggest to
the public that the police value procedural justice.135  Because accounta-
bility systems limit review to the conduct of individual officers, they are ill-
equipped to demonstrate to the public that systemic problems are being
seriously considered.136
2. Uniformity in Policing
This legitimacy issue is compounded among communities of color,
which view police forces with suspicion.137  Many communities of color do
not perceive police officers as enforcing the law equally.  When officers
use disrespectful language and reinforce implicit bias, they may fuel senti-
ments against the police as oppressors, rather than guardians.  By includ-
ing the victims of OIS and others who may have been involved from the
community, the police can learn how any why the individual may have
contributed to the occurrence of the OIS, and can learn valuable informa-
tion about the community’s perceptions of and reactions to the police.
These learnings may influence officer training and offer more useful de-
escalation techniques that can be standardized across the force, and pro-
vide the community with concrete evidence that the police force is sin-
cerely trying to improve its service to the community.  Each of these things
improves police legitimacy and community relations.
134. See Walter Katz, Enhancing Accountability and Trust with Independent Investi-
gations of Police Lethal Force, 128 HARVARD L. REV. FORUM 235, 237 (2015) (explain-
ing that “legitimacy crumbles when civilians are treated unfairly,” which leads to
conclusion that “police agencies are not accountable”); see also Helen Ubin˜as, Lack
of Police Transparency Breeds Anger and Mistrust, PHILLY.COM (Feb. 19, 2015, 03:01
AM), http://www.philly.com/philly/columnists/helen_ubinas/20150219_Lack_of
_police_transparency_breeds_anger_and_mistrust.html [https://perma.cc/KZ2G-
CXXF].
135. See Simmons, supra note 13, at 494–95, 506.
136. See id. (discussing individual officer reviews and inability of traditional
remedies to address systemic police misconduct).
137. See PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING, supra note 54, at
1 (“The public confers legitimacy only on those whom they believe are acting in
procedurally just ways.  In addition, law enforcement cannot build community
trust if it is seen as an occupying force coming in from the outside to impose
control on the community.”).
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3. Creating a Cultural Change Focused on Learning from Error, Rather Than
Denying Errors Occur
Bias and racism are recognized cultural problems among some police
forces.138  Although these problems may be exposed by accountability re-
view through the lens of an individual officer’s actions, RCA would offer
concrete starting points to address culturally driven intentional miscon-
duct and recklessness without the same level of punishment, and therefore
with a higher chance of adoption by the officers themselves.
In fact, President Obama’s 21st Century Task Force on Policing rec-
ommended incorporating internal procedural justice in the management
of police departments.139  Because behavior is more likely to conform to
culture than rules,140 solutions that fail to address systemic risk factors be-
yond the reach of an office’s rules will fall short of altering a force’s con-
duct.  Because RCA identifies the background systemic and human errors
and violations, it is much better positioned to find the starting points for
larger-scale cultural shifts within police forces.
Perhaps the most important contribution made by RCA to improving
the legitimacy of the police is in its transparency.  Consider the difference
in the Ferguson shooting as it transpired without RCA, and how different
the community reaction might have been in an RCA scenario.  In the lat-
ter, the Chief of Police in Ferguson would have called a press briefing and
said something like, “at this time in the investigation, we believe that this
shooting was in accordance with all existing police protocols and best
practices.  Should our administrative reviews reveal otherwise, we will of
course proceed with appropriate disciplinary procedures.  Either way, we
are convening a Root Cause Analysis to understand how this tragic event
could have been avoided, and we would expect to publish the results and
recommendations of that process for public comment within the next
sixty-to-ninety-days.”  This allows the community to hear an acknowledge-
ment of the event as an error while still protecting the police officer.
Transparency is important here too—people see the police engage in
open self-evaluation and see change happen as a result.
VI. USING “JUST CULTURE” CONCEPTS TO BALANCE INDIVIDUAL SAFETY
AND ACCOUNTABILITY
As outlined in this Article, Root Cause Analysis is a non-blaming ap-
proach to learning from error and a tool in the gradual improvement in a
system’s quality and safety over time.  At the same time, police officers are
highly trained professionals and are held to a high standard of personal
conduct.  Indeed, this high standard of professional and personal deport-
ment is often what attracts individuals to join the police force in the first
138. See, e.g., DOJ FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 126, at 62.
139. See PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING, supra note 54, at
14.
140. See id. 12.
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place.  Accordingly, an important part of the RCA process is to understand
and communicate the various contributing factors that helped cause the
unintended outcome.  In an OIS situation, communication about the
event must be tempered with care and support for the officer(s) who par-
ticipated in the shooting.  Whether the officers acted within protocols or
not, there are no “winners” in an OIS, and the officer who discharges his
weapon does so knowing that the full gamut of accountability review
processes, in addition to a tidal wave of media coverage, will consume his
or her life for the foreseeable future, most likely accompanied by a period
of administrative leave that may separate him from his trusted colleagues
and friends on the force.
Managers and supervisors on the force face an important challenge at
this time.  The officer involved in the shooting is suffering, the victim’s
family and the community are suffering, and other police officers are
watching closely to see how the department will react.  Striking the right
balance between supporting the officer and acknowledging the injury in
the community is essential, and the acceptance of the department’s ac-
tions will condition the enthusiasm of the officers on the force for ac-
cepting the recommendations for change generated by the RCA.
But what is the “right” response to the officers involved in an OIS?
Obviously, it will be dependent on circumstances.  The RCA can and must
differentiate between good faith conduct that nonetheless led to an error
in the high-pressure, rapidly changing and dangerous work of a police
officer on the one hand, and reckless, grossly negligent, or even inten-
tional misconduct by a bad actor who knowingly deviated from profes-
sional standards of conduct on the other.  The ability to make these
determinations accurately, consistently, and in a way that can be clearly
communicated to all officers will make the difference between policies
and managers who are respected and trusted, and those who are scorned
and ignored by the rank and file.
Healthcare has found itself in similar circumstances, specifically with
residents in surgical wards.  Like police, residents are highly trained pro-
fessionals following specific protocols for specific procedures.  Also like
police, the real-life situations they may face can change in an instant from
something manageable and familiar to something that is life-threatening
and terrifying, and for which the protocol may be inapplicable or ill-de-
fined.  How can RCA reviewers evaluate the individual’s performance in
the event and make recommendations to help that person both deal with
the aftermath of the surgical error and learn from it?
Healthcare’s answer is the pursuit of a “Just Culture.”  The Just Cul-
ture is one that “recognizes that competent professionals make mistakes
and acknowledges that even competent professionals will develop un-
healthy norms (shortcuts, “routine rule violations”), but has zero toler-
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ance for reckless behavior.”141  By separating conduct that is outside of
protocols from conduct that is below an acceptable threshold of profes-
sional department, the Just Culture concept allows managers to devise ap-
propriately measured responses to individual behaviors.  Thus, by infusing
a RCA with Just Culture teachings, a police force can identify and improve
system and environmental errors while treating the officers involved in the
event, many of whom may be suffering from the trauma of shooting or
killing another human being, with compassion while at the same time up-
holding the highest standards of policing.
A. The Just Culture Tool
One embodiment of a “Just Culture” process can be seen in the Just
Culture Tool developed by the Montefiore Medical Center in New York
City.142  Montefiore uses this tool to guide decision making regarding the
appropriate response to various participants in an adverse event or unin-
tended outcome that is reviewed via a RCA.143
FIGURE 5. MONTEFIORE MEDICAL CENTER JUST CULTURE REVIEW TOOL144
141. Just Culture, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH & QUALITY GLOSSARY,
http://psnet.ahrq.gov/popup_glossary.aspx?name=justculture [https://perma
.cc/T97N-BJP8] (last visited Oct. 31, 2017).
142. See Just Culture Tool, supra note 8.
143. See Figure 5; infra note 144.
144. See Just Culture Tool, supra note 8.  This image is a high-resolution digi-
tal reproduction of the original figure embedded within the Just Culture Tool.
–Ed.
36
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 5 [2017], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol62/iss5/2
2017] ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS 919
The Just Culture Tool adopts a two-part approach.145  It first asks
whether the actions of the individual constituted misconduct (e.g., inten-
tional departures from policy) or good-faith errors (e.g., departures from
protocols that were intended as “short cuts” or “workarounds” without an
intent to subvert the spirit of the process).146  Based on the answer to that
question, the tool guides reviewers to appropriate responses to ensure that
the participants in the event are treated in a way that is optimized for
future safety of the system.147  A hypothetical application of this Just Cul-
ture tool in an OIS setting follows.
B. Distinguishing Error from Misconduct
A Just Culture recognizes the differentiation between an intentional
act—that is, an act that was deliberately and knowingly done—and an in-
tentional misdeed, defined as an act that was intended to subvert system
safety or deliberately disobey system rules.  Intentional acts that are con-
ducted in good faith are viewed as good faith errors, rather than miscon-
duct.  Importantly, not all departures from protocol or best practice are
misconduct, if their intent is to enhance or improve the efficiency of the
work, rather than to avoid a system protection.
One example of this distinction can be seen in the recent incident in
Baltimore involving the death in custody of Freddie Gray.  In that case,
one of the arresting officers testified that he deviated from protocol in
failing to properly secure Mr. Gray to a seat using a seatbelt in the back of
a police van.148  His reason for this deviation was a stated belief that the
act of reaching for the seatbelt put his service revolver in proximity to the
arrestee and therefore put the officer at physical risk.149  If for purposes of
this example we take the officer at his word, such a deviation was not in-
tended to put Mr. Gray at risk of injury, but rather to protect the officer
from harm.  This would be a deliberate deviation from protocol, but one
that is classified as a good faith error for just culture purposes.  If, on the
other hand, the officer’s intent was to subject Mr. Gray to bodily harm
through a “rough ride” in the van, he has committed misconduct, and a
different managerial response is warranted.
By distinguishing error from misconduct, the investigator can expose
and target behavior that was designed to cause a bad outcome from behav-
ior that was intended to achieve a positive result, but nonetheless resulted
in a bad outcome.  The logical organizational response to each is
different.
145. See id.
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. See Owens, supra note 103 (describing officer’s failure to follow seatbelt
protocol).
149. See Khan, supra note 103 (explaining Officer Nero’s concern for his own
safety).
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The Montefiore Just Culture Tool divides the question into three cat-
egories, translated to police work as follows.150  First, if the officer fol-
lowed all protocols and procedures, the officer is not at fault, and the
event is treated as a “blameless adverse event.”151  This equates to a “clean
shoot,” and deserves a RCA, but no further investigation into officer
accountability.
Second, if the officer was “impaired” in some way, the system and its
safety mechanisms have been subverted by deliberate actions of the of-
ficer.  Examples of this would be firing a service weapon while intoxicated,
serving with a physical or emotional disability that might lead to overly
aggressive behavior (e.g., a mental illness that is untreated), or a deliber-
ate action on the part of the officer—for example, a murder.
Thus, the first two scenarios are relatively straightforward.  When an
officer clearly follows all protocols, we know the officer should be sup-
ported and the system improved.  When an officer clearly was impaired or
intentionally subverted the system, we know the officer should be removed
from duty and the other contributing factors that prevented detection of
the impairment should be addressed.  The more complex decision process
is reserved for a situation where the participant did not follow best
practice.
C. Forming Appropriate Managerial Responses to Error: The Intention Test
and the Substitution Test
How should police managers and RCA reviewers react to an OIS in
which the officer did not intentionally subvert protocols, but also did not
completely follow protocols?  Should an officer be fired for the role in an
OIS for a minor breach of a safety protocol that, no matter how uninten-
tional, contributes to an OIS (e.g., his taser was uncharged, forcing him to
draw his gun)?  Will such a policy help the organization, and the people in
it, grapple with, recover from, and improve by learning from the OIS?
The Just Culture Tool offers a process to frame the RCA review’s
recommendations.152
In a situation where an officer involved in an OIS deviated from pro-
tocols but did not intend for the deviations to lead to the OIS, RCA review-
ers combine two assessments into a two by two “option grid.”153  Reviewers
apply the Intention Test (“Did the officer intend to act outside of best
practices?”) and the Substitution Test (“Would a competent officer with
similar training have done the same?”).
The answer to each of these yes/no questions helps to determine the
appropriate response.  We distinguish among:
150. See Just Culture Tool, supra note 8.
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. See id.
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Human error: an inadvertent action; inadvertently doing other
than what should have been done; a slip, lapse, mistake;
At-risk behavior: behavior that increases risk where risk is not rec-
ognized, or is mistakenly believed to be justified; and
Reckless behavior: behavioral choice to consciously disregard a sub-
stantial and unjustifiable risk.154
Human error occurs when the event participant’s intent was to stay
within best practices, and an appropriately trained officer would have ac-
ted in the same way.  In healthcare, suppose a doctor intends to order
hydroxyzine for a patient, but instead accidentally orders hydralazine,
which lowers a patient’s blood pressure, causing the patient to fall and
hurt himself.  The doctor deviated from protocol by not confirming the
names, but in an unintentional way.  Given the similarity of the names, this
could have happened to a similarly situated competent physician.155
Thus, hearkening back to James Reason in the prior sections, we cannot
change the human condition—physicians may get confused when order-
ing drugs with similar names but different therapeutic effects—but we can
change the conditions under which humans operate.156  Perhaps a com-
puterized drug ordering system would flag the difference, and the FDA
has worked to modify drug names to make them less similar to existing
drugs on the market, for example.157
The situation can easily be analogized to policing.  Consider an of-
ficer who in the heat of the moment fires his weapon believing it is his
taser when in fact he has grabbed and is firing his firearm.  In that in-
stance, a situation in which the officer intended follow protocols, de-
ploying the minimum force necessary to subdue the individual without
subjecting the officer to bodily harm, becomes an OIS, without any intent
at all on the part of the officer.158  Another example might include in-
stances where officers execute an arrest warrant at the wrong address (e.g.,
323 S. Wilson Ave. instead of 323 S. Wilson St.), leading to negative out-
154. See Alison H. Page, Making Just Culture a Reality: One Organization’s Ap-
proach, ASS’N OF HEALTHCARE RES. QUALITY: PATIENT SAFETY NET (Oct. 2007),
https://psnet.ahrq.gov/perspectives/perspective/50/making-just-culture-a-reality-
one-organizations-approach [https://perma.cc/54GR-ACK2].
155. See Just Culture Tool, supra note 8; see also Philip G. Boysen, Just Culture:
A Foundation for Balanced Accountability and Patient Safety, 13 OCHSNER J. 400, 405
(2013) (explaining combination of models that includes second step of determin-
ing if similarly situated caregiver would react the same way in a similar situation).
156. See Reason, supra note 6, at 768.
157. See How FDA Reviews Proposed Drug Names, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., at 1
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/drugsafety/medicationerrors/ucm080867
.pdf [https://perma.cc/22E4-9MBH] (last visited Aug. 12, 2017) (discussing how
FDA works to increase safe use of drug products by refining policy for reviewing
proposed proprietary name).
158. See, e.g., Sarah Okeson, Officer Who Fired Gun, Not Taser, Faces Charge, USA
TODAY (July 10, 2014, 05:43 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/
2014/07/10/officer-shot-panhandler/12493779/ [https://perma.cc/YHG8-QRX
A].
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comes.  The RCA should provide recommendations for change, and the
department’s consolations should include the OIS victim and victim’s fam-
ily as well as the officer involved.
“At-Risk Behavior” occurs when the deviation from the protocol is in-
tentional, but a similarly competent officer would have reacted similarly
under the circumstances.159  Here we know that an error might occur, but
there is a considered reason for taking that risk that is deemed more im-
portant by the participant.
In healthcare, such a situation might occur when a nurse intention-
ally deviates from a protocol by preparing medications for three patients
at once.  There is a risk of administering the wrong drug to the wrong
patient.  In the nurse’s mind, however, it is more important to prepare the
medications quickly and believes the error will be avoided.160
In policing, consider an officer responding to a radio call reporting a
disturbance of the peace.  Upon arriving at the scene, the officer en-
counters a person suffering from a mental health crisis.  Although the of-
ficer has not received Crisis Intervention Training (CIT), the officer
decides to address the individual rather than requesting and waiting for
additional officers (who may have CIT training if either the dispatcher or
the officer newly on the scene can request it).  The officer’s attempt to
take the person into custody alone leads the individual to become combat-
ive as the officer starts shouting commands, leading to an unanticipated,
undesired, and unnecessary escalation that results in minor injuries to
both the officer and the individual.
Ideally, the at-risk behavior results in a near-miss, rather than an OIS.
In such cases, it is ideal to coach the participant and other similarly situ-
ated officers on how to avoid the situation in the future.  However, such
behavior should be closely monitored by the officer’s supervisors.  The
RCA will provide changes in the environment designed to help the officer
avoid such behavior in the future—for example, limiting the dispatch mes-
sage to officers with CIT training, or providing the dispatcher with the
responding officer’s CIT certification (or lack thereof), and training the
dispatcher on how to communicate with officers in each circumstance
given the training disparities.
Reckless behavior occurs when the participant intentionally deviated
from the protocol in a way that departs from the reasonably expected be-
havior of a similarly situated, competently trained officer.  While the par-
ticipant did not intend the adverse event to occur, the individual acted in
a way that knowingly created risk and should reasonably have been
avoided.  Suppose a surgeon needed to insert a femoral central line into a
159. See Boysen, supra note 155, at 404 (discussing at-risk behavior and mecha-
nism of breach of duty).
160. See Just Culture Tool, supra note 8; see also David Marx, Patient Safety and
the “Just Culture”, JUST CULTURE CMMTY. (2007), https://www.health.ny.gov/profes
sionals/patients/patient_safety/conference/2007/docs/patient_safety_and_the_
just_culture.pdf [https://perma.cc/R56S-RJQX].
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morbidly obese patient but a fat pannus was blocking the way.  Instead of
following well-known safety methods for lifting away the fat pannus, the
surgeon simply pushes the pannus out of the way with his left hand.  If his
grip slips and he ends up incorrectly inserting the femoral central line, the
surgeon has acted recklessly, creating a risky situation that he should have
handled differently.  The surgeon should be subject to discipline.161  Simi-
lar examples of reckless police behavior might involve reckless pursuit of
fleeing suspects or when responding to emergency calls.
Finally, the RCA may confront situations in which the participant de-
viated from the protocol unintentionally, and in a situation where a com-
petent officer would not have been expected to.  Such actions raise
questions of competence for the role.  Such can be seen in a physician
with five years of experience who fails to notice a critical medical condi-
tion revealed by an EKG.162
In policing, lack of competence by a responding officer may escalate a
situation further while needlessly putting himself and other police in dan-
ger.  The San Francisco OIS of Mario Woods is a cautionary tale, in which
a San Francisco Police Department Officer put himself in harm’s way in an
attempt to prevent Mr. Woods from fleeing after Mr. Woods had said “You
better . . . kill me.”163  In such a situation, additional training and reme-
dial attention should be provided to the officer, and the officer should be
supervised more closely and have a heightened standard for future partici-
pation on the police force.  Another potential solution would be to im-
prove tactical command in these larger scale response teams so that
commanding officers can intervene sooner when junior officers needlessly
place themselves in harm’s way.  The larger RCA, in the meantime, should
focus on environmental, supervisory, or other changes that might prevent
the circumstance as well.
VII. CONCLUSION
Every day, tens of thousands of police officers across the country work
diligently to satisfy the oath they swore to protect and serve the individuals
in their communities.  In the name of public safety, these officers partici-
pate in countless community interactions with individuals from all walks of
life.  Interactions can become confrontations, and confrontations can turn
violent or life-threatening in an instant.
161. See, e.g., Just Culture Tool, supra note 8; see also Marx, supra note 160
(stating that reckless behavior should be managed through punitive action).
162. See Just Culture Tool, supra note 8.
163. See Phil Matier & Andy Ross, Mario Woods’ Last moments: “You better squeeze
that . . . and kill me”, SFGATE, (Feb. 9, 2016, 04:41 PM) http://www.sfgate.com/
bayarea/article/Mario-Woods-last-moments-You-better-6778777.php [https://per
ma.cc/Y4WU-5NAQ] (Officer Charles August stepped into Mr. Woods’ path, and
his partners opened fire to defend Officer August).
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Our system of policing has developed rules and norms designed to
protect both our officers and our citizens from harm.  Despite our best
efforts, however, we continue to experience OIS at an alarming rate.164
We believe that every OIS is a tragedy—an unacceptable outcome to a
police/civilian interaction, and one that is desired neither by the officer,
nor certainly by the victim of the shooting.  It is an essential requirement
for every jurisdiction in the country that we do our best to learn from each
OIS, studying the contributing factors that combined to create a circum-
stance where a police officer believed he faced the threat of deadly force
and responded in kind.
The retrospective accountability reviews currently deployed in re-
sponse to OIS, including internal administrative reviews, civilian oversight
boards, and civil and criminal litigation, have important roles in a system
for officer and department accountability and for remediation to victims.
Such retrospective reviews are unlikely to provide forward-looking gui-
dance to prevent the next OIS, and their utility as preventive deterrents
has been limited, a fact made clear by the continued high incidence of
OIS across the country.
RCA is a technique that has been used successfully for decades in
other complex, dynamic, high-stress, zero-tolerance for error systems, such
as aviation, healthcare, and nuclear power.165  Its principles of non-blam-
ing, forward-looking event review should be deployed alongside the afore-
mentioned accountability mechanisms to generate proactive reforms to
reduce OIS over time.  By coupling the RCA with a Just Culture tool to
appropriately assess the actions of the officer(s) participating in the OIS,
managers will be able to generate implementable reforms that will im-
prove officer and community safety, will improve officer morale, reassure
the community, and restore police legitimacy in the wake of the undesired
OIS.  RCAs should be required for all OIS in each police force in the
country, with a report on the incident and the recommendations of the
RCA published for the betterment of all.
164. See Fatal Force, supra note 12.
165. See Matt Lillywhite & Paul Dyer, Root Cause Analysis, CIV. AVIATION AU-
THORITY 1 (June 29, 2016), https://www.caa.co.uk/uploadedFiles/CAA/Content/
Standard_Content/Commercial_industry/Aircraft/Airworthiness/Seminars/Cor-
porate_aviation_June_2016/FWM20160629_09_Root%20Cause%20Analysis.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JUU8-F8ML] (explaining Root Cause Analysis in aviation); see
also INT’L ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS FOLLOWING AN EVENT AT A
NUCLEAR INSTALLATION: REFERENCE MANUAL 1 (Jan. 2015), http://www-pub.iaea
.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/TE-1756_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/3VWG-
YL5Z] (explaining Root Cause Analysis in nuclear power); Root Cause Analysis,
AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RES. & QUALITY: PATIENT SAFETY NETWORK, https://
psnet.ahrq.gov/primers/primer/10/root-cause-analysis [https://perma.cc/QQY5-
3PHW] (last visited Oct. 31, 2017) (explaining Root Cause Analysis in healthcare).
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